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Abstract - This paper primarily harps on the issue whether the admission of universals (Especially as 
discussed in this paper resemblance and supervenience) would impose any extra burden on the 
ontology. In this connection I would like to make a special mention of the fact that metaphysical issues 
dealt in Philosophy are quite relevant in medical ethics and management speculations or even in 
marketing.  In this paper both the relation of Supervenience and that of Resemblance is dealt which 
undoubtedly helps in the understanding of properties, the structure or orientation of any programming 
or theory. So the present paper may be a sure help in prioritization of issues in case of management 
study or in the removal of any disharmony generated in patients after treatment of an ailment. Keeping 
this in mind  I have tried to analyze the almost known fact that providing an account of sameness of 
type is the compulsory task for any theory of Universals since unless the question of sameness of type is 
answered and a philosophical superstructure is unfolded the question of making or arriving at an 
ontology which is not unduly burdened can at all be addressed. I started with the Realist and the 
Nominalist.  In order to arrive at this position I had first discussed about the positions of the different 
types of Nominalism. I have also tried to show how realism and the different forms of nominalism have 
made an attempt to explain the compulsory task of giving an account of sameness of type. I have 
seriously dealt with a very crucial point of considering resemblance as a relation and supervenience as 
a relation. Here one thing is stressed on namely that both supervenience and resemblance if and when 
considered as a dyadic universal which binds two relatas, it works as a property of a pair ( relatas). So it 
can very well be thought of as gaining a separate status over and above the pair that it unites. The 
whole discussion on a non-cumbersome ontology thus gains its strength at this point when such extra 
burden is ruled out by both supervenience and resemblance nominalism theory. I have made an attempt 
also to show that a burden less ontology can also be achieved if further questions on the issue of 
similarity being subjective or objective or simply as innate be addressed. 
Keywords- 
1. Realism- A theory of Universals which claims that the explanation of objects lays in the common 
property that different non-identical objects share at the same time. This common property may 
very well transcend the given object 
2. Nominalism- A theory of Universals which claims that the explanation of an object lies in the 
issues related with properties and relations which the objects possess.  Nominalism refrains from 
making any reference to shared or common properties and accord primacy to the attributes as 
fundamental by taking beings to be not susceptible to any further analysis. 
3. Resemblance theory- Resemblance is taken as a property between objects which is actually a weak 
sort of identity relation. It is a relation which intertwines amongst objects and explains their being 
members of a given class. 
4. Supervenience theory- Supervenience is a relation which can be true of any relation whatsoever. 
So it is more of a super order or a higher order relation. It is important to note that whether this 
higher order relation is imposing any burden on the existing ontology. 
5. Ontology- It is the theory of existence which is an integral part of any philosophical discourse. 
Ontology studies what sort of existence the entity has in any philosophical discussion. The 
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ontological status(in what way does an entity exist) is very important in any philosophical 
discussion. 
6. Universals- Universals is an important metaphysical issue, which explains the identity of objects 
on the basis of shared common property. Realists claims  that universals are entities that can be 
simultaneously exemplified by several different objects, 
 
1.INTRODUCTION 
One of the very pertinent question as to whether the acceptance of properties, classes or for that matter  
universals as such is imposing any undue pressure on the ontology needs to be addressed. In the present 
chapter an attempt may be made to address the issue in terms of the explanation provided by the 
resemblance nominalists and the supervenience theory.  For this we must first discuss the compulsory task 
for both realists and the nominalists. 
2. THE COMPULSORY TASK 
We are continually talking about different things having the same property or quality; being of the same 
sort or kind having the same nature and so on. It seems that giving an account of sameness of type has 
become a compulsory task for any and every philosophical system.  The point which puzzles philosophers 
is that the same property can belong to different things and that the same relation can relate different 
things. So there must be something identical among the particular things which are not identical. Here we 
must primarily explain in what sense is this concept of being identical and yet not being identical, used. 
The particulars are not identical in having their own peculiar properties and qualities. We can talk of these 
properties as factors which distinguish one particular from other particulars. We also know that the very 
fact of being more than one separates, distinguishes particulars in general. Apart from being many in 
number particulars also falls under a class by way of which they are classified as similar particulars. This 
class character has many a times in Philosophy called as sameness of type. Before explaining the details 
about how the realist and the nominalists explains this critical issue there is another important point which 
can add color to our discussion. The point is ; the point of similarity is not always in terms of the common 
properties which a group or classes of particulars have. The point of commonness can very well be the 
common properties which the set or class of particulars does not have. So commonness may be explained 
and taken under consideration in the sense of possessing properties and also in the sense of not possessing 
properties. In fact the same class of particulars may be classified on the basis of both possessing and not 
possessing a common property. An example might help in this regard. If we have a stick which is 15 cm 
long and a stick which is 12cm long then all sticks measuring 15 cm long may be classified into a   class 
having the common property of length 15cm.  All sticks which are 12cm long may be classified in similar 
way. An alternative may be such that, all sticks of length 15cm is 3cm longer than sticks of length 12cm. 
This difference of length (especially in case of the class of sticks which are 12cm long, in their case not 
having the 3cm length also acts as a common property) is also a common property between the two 
classes of sticks. The only difference being that once the sticks may be classified as possessing a particular 
common property and once they may be classified as not possessing a common property. In the second 
case the property of non-possession of a property   in other words ,the case of all sticks which are 12cm 
long and which do not possess another 3cm to be 15cm long. So once this particular class of sticks may be 
classified as all sticks possessing the common property of possessing the property of measuring 12cm, 
again if the same class is compared to another class that is the class of sticks possessing the common 
property of measuring 15cm then in that case their common property would be the non-possession of the 
property of not possessing +3cm length so that their total length be 15cm.  
All these discussions become important for this paper because this will actually lay the ground for the 
entire upcoming discussion on supervenience. Whenever we talk of objects possessing properties we 
actually frame our arguments in a domain where we eventually project relations amongst classes, one of 
which supervenes another. The supervenience may be for example amongst classes like all red colored 
objects and all colored objects. Again the supervenience may be amongst all objects possessing a common 
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property and hence being classified whiles all objects not possessing a common property and hence being 
classified. In all such cases we actually talk of many classes at the same time while dealing with a single 
one, hence brining in the discussion on supervenience. The present paper would try to explain 
supervenience but for the present lets discuss how both the realist and the nominalists deal with the 
common question of sameness of type. 
Realist and nominalists react to the puzzle in different ways. For the realist besides particulars there are 
universals; that is, the commonness among particulars. In other words it is not the case that there are only 
particulars. The problem which the nominalists face is that of giving an account of the identity of 
numerically different particulars. The nominalists are philosophers who refrain from making any reference 
to shared or common Forms as entities and accord primacy to the phenomena of attribute agreement as 
fundamental fact; in the sense not susceptible to any further analysis. As for the realist giving an account 
of the sameness of type is indisputably of first priority; Armstrong has taken up the case of nominalism to 
show how the compulsory question is inevitable for them as well. Armstrong deals with a variety of 
nominalism. Nominalists can attempt to explain apparent sameness of numerically different particulars by 
way of postulating some other means; be it ‘falling under the same predicate’, or ‘being a member of a 
class’ or for that matter ‘having a suitable resemblance with a paradigm case’ are ultimately all different 
approaches of explaining the same compulsory question.  
The nominalists actually try to explain the phenomena of sharing of properties by different individuals by 
confining himself within the purview of particulars themselves.  They thus  employ the notions like that of 
‘predicates’ or ‘class-membership’ or ‘resemblance to paradigm cases’ etc The realist who explains the 
sameness of type as the cause to account for sharing any one property, is  deviating from the   line of 
thought and perhaps falls outside the arena of particular objects. Armstrong makes repeated attempt to 
demolish the nominalists endeavor of determining the phenomena of  having a property in terms of 
expressions such as ‘by falling under a predicate’ or ‘having a resemblance to a paradigm case’ etc. He 
argues that the whiteness of an object is not due to the object falling under the predicate ‘white’. It is the 
applicability of the predicate ‘white’ which depends upon the whiteness of the object. 
To understand this better I would now like to discuss over the different types of nominalism, namely, 
predicate nominalism, class nominalism and resemblance nominalism. This would help us to understand 
both the difficulty which Armstrong has detected in his book “Universals and Scientific Realism”   
regarding all these different forms of nominalism and it will also make clear the temperament of the realist 
and the nominalists.  
2.1 PREDICATE NOMINALISM 
The prime contention of the predicate nominalists as claimed by Armstrong is as follows; - 
‘a has the property, F, if and only if  
a falls under the predicate ‘F’’. (Armstrong 1978, p. 13). 
If we analyze this we get the following explanation. Given a class, a class of white things, each white 
thing has the same sort of relation to the predicate ‘white’. Here every member of the class of white things 
is a token and the predicate ‘white’ to which each member have the same sort of relation (falling under) is 
the type. So any and every token of the predicate white has the same sort of relation to the predicate type 
‘white’. So types are the phenomena to be reduced to predicates. The predicate nominalists have covertly 
appealed to types in course of developing a theory which claims to give a reductive analysis of types. 
Armstrong’s contention is that, the predicate nominalists’ reductive account of types only lands in 
reinstantiating further types, which is no advance. 
2.1.1 CLASS NOMINALISM 
The class nominalists are no exception. Their main contention as claimed by Armstrong is as follows; - 
‘a has the property, F, if and only if 
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a is a member of the class of Fs’. (Armstrong 1978, p. 15). 
Here too the nominalists has made a similar mistake; ‘a’s’ being a member of a class of Fs is presumably a 
matter of a relation holding between ‘a’ and the class. This relation ought to depend upon a’s having the 
property F or a’s being F.  The nominalists has just reversed the case by saying that the relation, that is., 
that of being a member of a class constitutes each member’s having the said property. To have a clear 
perception of this we consider a white thing which is a member of a class of white things. According to 
the class nominalists the object’s whiteness is constituted by its membership of that class. 
A white thing being a member of the class of white things has a relation with the class, i.e. the relation of 
being a member. So we can at most say that the relation of being a member depends upon the thing’s 
being white; but the thing’s whiteness can never depend upon its membership. This becomes more evident 
if suppose that except the particular white thing we are talking about, there are no other members of that 
class. In other words that it is a unit class. The thing would still remain white despite it’s being the solo 
member of the class of white things. So whiteness does never depend upon the membership of a class. 
2.1.1.1 RESEMBLANCE NOMINALISM 
In case of resemblance nominalism, resemblance too is a relation or is the uniting principle which the 
resemblance nominalists provide amongst particulars. For example, if we say that a particular is white 
because it resembles other white things more closely than it resembles any other thing then the trouble is 
that we would try to unite red things by using the same formula of resemblance. A resemblance 
nominalists would obviously keep himself away from such explanation that would appeal to the difference 
between redness and whiteness. So if it is the same resemblance which ought to distinguish the two cases 
of red and white; then the resemblance nominalists can at most say that white things has suitable 
resemblance to this thing; while red things as a suitable resemblance to that. 
But here too two things are white because they suitably resemble a paradigm white, should not be the 
case; for a paradigm for one property-class i.e. the class of white tables can also serve as a paradigm for 
another, for example, the class of white chairs. In other words they may serve purposes over and above the 
one they are intended for. In order to stop this it will be needed that the paradigms be intended for any one 
property class only, but then the content of the resemblance nominalism rather stands as falsified. The 
prime contention of such nominalism as claimed by Armstrong is as follows; - 
‘a has the property, F, if and only if  
a suitably resembles a paradigm case (or paradigm cases) of an F’. (Armstrong 1978, p. 15). 
Here resemblance to paradigm cases seems prime and a’s being F be explained in terms of resemblance. 
So here the notion of having a property need to be analyzed but if in order to fix paradigm for any one 
intended property-class be essential then we perhaps are using the same property-class which needs to be 
analyzed. Since the task exceeds the means available; what else can be said of their aim of explaining 
sameness or similarity without appealing to types. 
3. A JUSTIFICATION FOR BOTH THE REALIST AS WELL FOR THE NOMINALISTS 
All this time I was simply trying to have a picturesque framework of what Armstrong has to say. In 
perusing such analysis I must say that, I saw both the stands of the realist as well as that of the nominalists 
as justified. Nominalism has made attempts sometimes by way of making predicates or class-membership 
or resemblance as primitive and unanalyzable. They have tried to explain ‘having of a property’ without 
going beyond particulars; because as for e.g.; falling under the same predicate is but, about particulars 
themselves. It is surely something very much unlike that of ‘whiteness’ or ‘redness’ to which the realists 
had appealed to. The question which ignites the spark, I suppose is; if a Platonist can say for e.g., this 
statue participates in the Form of beauty and hence is beautiful; why not a predicate nominalists can say 
that 
‘a’ has the property F if and only if  
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‘a’ falls under the predicate F.  
The realist and the nominalists try to answer the compulsory question of sameness of type. It is as per the 
temperament of the distinctive ‘isms’ that they have dealt with the compulsory question. In explaining 
sameness of type, the Platonists schema places or assigns fundamentality to the Forms or rather 
participation in the said Forms and hence provides us an explanation of particulars. Whereas a predicate 
nominalists is in favor the ‘falling under a predicate’ as primitive and fundamental. In both the cases be it 
‘participation in Forms’ or ‘falling under a predicate’ the two ‘isms’ equally dislike to go beyond the said 
primitives. So why are we to judge the standard or criterion of one, keeping in mind the criterion of 
another? That the whiteness of an object cannot depend on its falling under the predicate white is true but 
only if we let realism to rule. Moreover perhaps such confusion won’t even crop up in such a 
circumstance.  
So according to me if unanalyzed primitives be allowed in case of the realist, equal freedom must be given 
to the nominalists camp as well; as long as they both deal with the compulsory philosophical question of 
giving an account of sameness of type. 
3.1 RESEMBLANCE IN TERMS OF SUPERVENIENCE (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
RESEMBLANCE NOMINALISM)- 
In the present paper I would like to examine, the relation of resemblance and to find out whether it creates 
any extra pressure on the ontology as such. This is important since we have to address the compulsory 
question for the philosophers on the one hand while on the other we also need to find whether the 
ontology is not being cumbersome.   In this connection it would be helpful to bring in the view point of 
resemblance nominalists and the discussion about theory of supervenience. Here I would like to rely upon 
Hume and Armstrong in proportion.  
To start with I must refer back to Treatise, where Hume has suggested that every relation there is may be 
brought under one of the seven different heads: resemblance, identity, relations of time and place, 
proportion in quantity or number, degree in any quality, contrariety and causation. The first sort Hume 
calls “Relations of Ideas”. He places in this group, resemblance, proportion in quantity and number, 
degree in any quality and contrariety.1 The rest of the three he calls “Matters of Fact”. Armstrong on the 
other hand brought in a division consisting of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ relations. Armstrong’s proposed 
definition of ‘internal relation’ is, “Two or more particulars are internally related if and only if there exist 
properties of the particulars which logically necessitate that the relation holds”. (Armstrong 1978, p.85). 
Armstrong treats resemblance as an internal relation and also refers to it as a relational property. By 
admitting non-relational property, Armstrong actually admits properties. So properties can be understood 
as monadic universals; where as relational property or relation as polyadic universals. They are polyadic 
since a relation holds between two things. The “non-relational property” indicates properties which are 
understood with regard to a single thing; for e.g. ‘x is red’. Now the question may be raised as to why not 
a relational property which holds between x and y be understood as a property of x and y taken together or 
as a whole?  If relations be understood as holding between pairs, why not these pairs be treated as a unit 
and the relation be a property of that unit. The only difference in that case would be, that when a class is 
formed on the basis of a single common property, the instances are single individuals; when a class is 
formed on the basis of a relation is common there the instances occur in pairs. Now the question arises 
that if relations are the property of a unit composing of a pair then why these should be treated as 
polyadic. Is it not plausible to call them monadic as well? In other words, is it not plausible to view them 
as analyzable species of monadic universals. Now if we try to explain this keeping in mind that 
resemblance is a relational property we arrive at the following observations- 
1.  We may have resemblance as a relational property;  
2.  X may be something that resembles Y.  
 
1These are what the moderns like Armstrong calls internal relations.  
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3.  So either we keep resemblance as a monadic universal or property (just like any other property 
resemblance being a relational property, monadic in nature of X and Y as a whole) or 
4.  We can show that resemblance is a relation holding between X and Y that is. as a relation it is neither 
wholly in X nor is it in Y, but that Xand Y can both enter into a relation of resemblance and hence 
exemplify a dyadic universal. Hence it is no more than a dyadic companion to a monadic notion of 
relational property.2 
So resemblance being an internal relation can supervene on the terms it relates but it certainly is not an 
entity over and above the terms it relates. This is to say that the supervenient is not an addition to what it 
supervenes on. A supervenience thesis is thus better known as reductionist thesis (an ontologically 
reductionist thesis). It is a stripped down form of reductionism for it is devoid of claims of ontological 
priority or claims of translatability.3 
The case of resemblance has perhaps proved such points. Let us examine resemblance as a relation in case 
it is segregated as a relational property of a unit composing of two individuals; as well in case when it is 
considered as a relation holding between two separate individuals. In both these cases, the theory of 
supervenience prevails. It will also be seen that the theory of supervenience actually prevents from making 
the ontology a cumbersome one. For e.g. if X and Y resembles in being white, then we may deduce the 
followings;-  
(a)  X and Y have properties.  
(b)  X and Y resemble.  
(c)  The point of resemblance between them is the color white.  
(d) The other properties that they possess are not the point of resemblance between them. So we can have 
two schemes, either segregate resemblance as a relation and treat it as a property like the other non-
resembling properties or take resemblance as a dyadic Universal, a relation which supervenes on the 
related terms(i.e. X and Y in this case) but deny it of giving a separate ontological status.  
As far as our first scheme goes if we segregate resemblance as a relational property from its being 
polyadic then it is expected to act simply as a property of any individual thing. For, e.g. just as white can 
be a property of a thing; it can also be a relational property of a unit. In other words just as a property 
supervene as an explanation behind a grouping so also a relational property supervenes as an explanation 
behind pairing and thus grouping of like things.  The explanation is not something over and above the 
explained. This is to say, the supervenient is not an addition to what it supervenes on. There is therefore 
no question of ontological priority or translatability. In fact supervenience as a theory depicts a hierarchy; 
where the different strata only complement each other; instead of competing with each other. 
 
2Three things that must be remembered are, 1. Internal relations are prominent candidates of supervenient 
entities. 2 It is strongly suggested that resemblance (as an internal relation) must be analyzed in terms of 
the nature of the resembling things and not vice-versa. 3. Internal relations are all supervenient on 
properties, including relational properties of the related terms. This means that such relations are not 
entities wholly distinct from their terms. A detail explanation of these points is given in Armstrong, D.M, 
A Combinatorial theory of Possibility, Cambridge University Press, 1989.   
3Supervenience is a thesis which depicts a hierarchy, but not with the intention to prove that the one at the 
top, i.e. that which supervenes is more fundamental from the supervened. It does not try to establish that, 
which supervenes is ontologically prior. It is for the same reason that it also depicts that we need not 
understand the supervened in terms of that which supervenes. In other words in order to understand the 
supervened we need not understand explanations which translates the nature of the supervened in terms of 
that which supervenes. 
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The second scheme of ours equally proves supervenience as a factor which simplifies the whole picture. If 
a relation (here resemblance) holds between two things  X and Y and hence is a polyadic universal then 
too it does not achieve a separate ontological status, and thus does not cause a cramped appearance of the 
ontology. Resemblance as a relation (i.e. any relation whatsoever) simply binds its relata. It is neither 
wholly present in X (one such relata) nor is it wholly in Y (another relata). But if we try to understand X 
or Y and if our intention is to give an explanation in terms of resemblance as a relation then we would find 
it to be present equally in the two relata.  It would not be the case that the proportion in which it is present 
in one is in any way more or less in proportion than its present in the other.  The thing that must be made 
clear is that even, if, relation is understood as polyadic, its polyadic nature is to be understood as 
encompassing two relata in terms of its tendency to bind. In other words a relation supervenes on its relata 
from a higher supervenience order but it nevertheless complements the supervened. It can be said that 
universals supervene on particulars and thus obtain an explanation of their being. This rules out any 
possibility of exerting any pressure by establishing itself as more fundamental or the most fundamental. 
Now if the resemblance nominalist wants to prove their contention by way of supervenience theory it 
would go as follows; - a has the property F (a particularized Universal, for e.g. white) if and only if “a” 
suitably resembles a paradigm case (or paradigm cases) of an F (the paradigm case of white)4. So we have 
a particularized Universal which is ‘white’ only of ‘a’ (a determinate property) and the resemblance with 
‘the white’ i.e. the determinable. Since a determinable can very well supervene a determinate property 
(without adding anything to the ontology) and this can be true for all such cases of white; we can well 
explain having of a property in terms of resemblance. 
Thus far I have been talking in terms of resemblance and trying to prove how universals as such do not 
pose any extra burden on the ontology. Resemblance was rather made a means and it has been proved to 
be an effective one.  
4. THE QUESTION OF SIMILARITY: RECONSIDERED- 
There are three strands of answer to the question, whether the notion of similarity or kind is subjective or 
objective. If the notion of similarity be subjective, then a plausible explanation would suggest; that we 
have latent or predisposed urge towards similarity; in other words, it may be attempted that it is our 
natural disposition towards similarity that makes it innate in nature.  
If it is taken to be objective then  it may be presumed that uniformities were present already, i.e. it is not 
we, who cause groupings, rather it is our interest and benefit which drives us in our use of a general word 
or predicate. The latter explanation being, that a general word or a predicate corresponds to a natural class 
which again is formed on the basis of a common property.  We can utmost own is the credit of re-
application of a word. 
The third strand of answer and perhaps the most viable one would maintain that; the question should not 
be wherein similarity lies; whether it lies with the subject itself or whether it lies amongst the objects 
grouped. The question could have been imagined or framed otherwise. Let us think this way, if we grant 
that the sense of similarity or the notion of kind is innate then that can be taken as its point of 
commencement. In other words it could very well be such that the notion of kind originated as an innate 
notion. At this preliminary stage it was not much workable a notion; but with experience, disposition gets 
polished and sophisticated and actually made its mark in explicating that objects of nature indeed had 
prior similarities amongst themselves.  
This is as much true a fact as it is true that these objects were awaiting for their being grouped and 
bunched for a better recognition. So if the notion of kind and similarity be innate and its being innate 
carries with it the notion that it is more like an animal sense of similarity, devoid of any intellectual 
 
4 The formulation of resemblance nominalism was originally given by Armstrong in his book Universals 
and scientific Realism, vol-I. I have tried to explain it again in terms of supervenience theory. 
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construction; then it is also true that such animal sense of similarity can be refined by scientific 
sophistication. 
The sense of similarity thus completes its voyage only when it shrugs off its animal brute ness giving us a 
crystal clear picture of the entire process. It starts with the animal sense of repetition or imitation and ends 
in enabling us to reach the true destiny of similarity, i.e. the objects of this world where the similarity sort 
of floats amongst its instances. The effort itself of locating similarity is rather redundant. We must on the 
other hand know what makes it so effective and crucial.  
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